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I.

INTRODUCTION

While much is heard about new “value-based” payment models for
health care, the reality is that old-fashioned business models emphasizing
higher unit prices and discrete billable services still prevail and succeed in
driving up health care costs.1 Indeed, providers have cited the spread of
*.
Jackson Williams is Director of Government Affairs at Dialysis Patient
Citizens. He received an MPA from Governors State University in 1996, his J.D. from Loyola
University of Chicago School of Law in 1988, and his B.A. from the University of Illinois at
Chicago in 1985. From 2010 to 2013 he worked at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services. Previously he was a health services researcher in the AARP Public Policy Institute
and a lobbyist on health policy issues for three non-profit associations. He is an NAIC
Funded Consumer Representative, and also was in 2003-2004. He has taught courses in
political science and law at the University of Illinois at Chicago, IIT-Kent College of Law,
and Pennsylvania State University, Harrisburg.
1.
See Robert Berenson, Addressing Pricing Power in Integrated Delivery:
The Limits of Antitrust, 40 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 711, 712 (2015); Matthew Rae et al.,
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global payment models as an excuse for continued market consolidation by
providers.2 Even relatively low-cost integrated delivery systems, such as
Kaiser-Permanente, profit from opportunistic behavior by competing
providers, since their premiums can “shadow” those of insurers who must
contract with high-cost providers.3
Ideally, insurers would act as purchasing cooperatives on behalf of
consumers, obtaining the lowest possible unit prices from providers.4 But
the most effective tools that purchasers could deploy—including antitrust
and other litigation against providers who act opportunistically—go unused.5
As the late health economist Warren Greenberg argued,6 this is partly
because of the collective action problem inherent in a multi-payer market.7
In this context, the collective action problem refers to the fact that while
many purchasers share an interest in lower unit prices for health care, it is not
always in the interest of an individual purchaser to expend resources on
measures, such as initiating costly litigation or provoking an acrimonious
impasse that, if successful, would likely benefit competing insurers or
employers as well.8 But, more generally, it has been observed that payers
have not “pushed back” on prices.9
This Article argues that insurance regulators can catalyze cost
containment efforts by encouraging, or mandating, insurers to act vigorously
as agents of consumers in obtaining low prices from providers to include
policing provider misconduct in health care markets.10 The Insurance
Commissioner’s regulatory authority can solve the collective action problem
Snapshots: The Prevalence and Cost of Deductibles in Employer Sponsored Insurance,
KFF.ORG (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/snapshots-theprevalence-and-cost-of-deductibles-in-employer-sponsored-insurance.
2.
See CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, WALL STREET COMES TO
WASHINGTON 2 (2004); Robert A. Berenson et al., The Growing Power of Some Providers to
Win Steep Payment Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy Remedies May Be Needed, 31
HEALTH AFF. 973, 979 (2012).
3.
Sarah Varney, Could Kaiser Permanente’s Low-Cost Health Care Be
Even Cheaper?, NPR (June 25, 2012, 5:36 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2012/06/26/155726049/could-kaiser-permanentes-low-cost-health-care-be-evencheaper.
4.
See Berenson et al., supra note 2, at 979.
5.
See Berenson, supra note 1, at 714.
6.
Warren Greenberg, Private Antitrust As a Public Good, 8 LOY. CONSUMER
L. REP. 118, 118 (1996).
7.
See id.
8.
See id. at 122–23.
9.
DIANA FARRELL ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., ACCOUNTING FOR THE
COST OF US HEALTH CARE: A NEW LOOK AT WHY AMERICANS SPEND MORE 105 (2008); see
also infra Section IV.B.
10.
See infra Section IV.B.
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The
by apportioning costs and, thereby, incentivize cooperation.11
Commissioner can also serve as a coordinator of, and spokesperson for, joint
efforts to bring down provider prices.12
II.

THE INSURANCE COMPANY AS AN AGENT OF PURCHASERS

Two recent trends have significantly changed the way consumers
interface with health insurance: Rising deductibles and self-funded plans.13
Today, for most consumers, the most important function of a health
insurance company in a given year will not be paying for health utilization,
but negotiating prices with providers.14
In 2003, only about half of employer-sponsored insurance (“ESI”)
that covered workers’ health plans had a deductible at all—by 2013, it was
81%.15 In 2003, the average deductible was $518, a decade later it was
$1273, a 146% increase.16 In about 20% of workplaces, employees have
access to only high-deductible health plans, with a deductible averaging
$2100.17 For about forty-two million Americans with ESI who spend over
$300 on care but do not meet the average deductible in a given year, a 5%
reduction in provider prices would yield an average of $30 in direct and
immediate savings on out-of-pocket costs.18 For this group, the principal
role of the insurance company is that of purchasing cooperative—combining
the buying power of multiple enrollees to obtain the lowest price.19
III.

THE PROBLEM OF EXCESS PRICES

Comparisons of health care costs across the thirty industrialized
countries, for which the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (“OECD”) publishes data, demonstrates “that the United States
spends more on health care than any of the other OECD countries spend,
without providing more services than the other countries do. This suggests

11.
See infra Section IV.B.II.
12.
See infra Section IV.B.II.
13.
CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, supra note 2, at 2.
14.
See Berenson, supra note 1, at 712; Jay Hancock, Should Big Insurance
Become Like Walmart to Lower Health Costs?, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 11, 2016),
http://www.khn.org/news/should-big-insurance-become-like-walmart-to-lower-health-costs.
15.
SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, NATIONAL TRENDS IN
THE COST OF EMPLOYER HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE, 2003–2013 4 (2014).
16.
Id. at 5.
17.
Rae et al., supra note 1.
18.
See id.
19.
See Berenson et al., supra note 2, at 979.
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that the difference in spending is mostly attributable to higher prices of
goods and services.”20
According to the International Federation of Health Plans 2015
Comparative Price Report,21 an annual survey comparing medical prices per
unit in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, and United States, the United States has the highest prices for two
of five diagnostic tests compared, eight of eight surgical procedures
compared, and hospital costs per day.22 In a finding that will amaze any
American who has traveled to Switzerland and paid the equivalent of five
dollars for a bottle of Coke, the survey reported that patients in Geneva,
Illinois or Geneva, New York could expect to pay twice the price for a
colonoscopy or magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) scan paid in those
towns’ European namesake.23
We know that in some local markets, provider unit prices are
exceptionally high.24 A 2005 United States Government Accountability
Office Report found that in 28 of 232 metropolitan areas studied, hospital
prices were 25% or higher than the national average, and in 32 of 319
metropolitan areas—many in Wisconsin, Oregon, Arkansas, Montana, and
Louisiana—physician prices were 16% or higher than the national average.25
Three factors driving higher prices are provider consolidation,
provider “must-have” status, and the refusal of providers to participate in
insurers’ networks.26
A.

Provider Market Concentration

In an analysis of commercial “insurance claims between 2007 and
2011 from three of the five largest U.S. insurers, Aetna, Humana, and United
20.
Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States
is So Different from Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFF. 89, 90 (2003).
21.
INT’L FED’N OF HEALTH P LANS, 2015 COMPARATIVE PRICE REPORT:
VARIATION IN MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL PRICES BY COUNTRY (2015).
22.
Id. at 3, 11–24.
23.
See id. at 13–14.
24.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-856, FEDERAL
EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM: COMPETITION AND OTHER FACTORS LINKED TO WIDE
VARIATION IN HEALTH CARE PRICES 2 n.6, 11, 18 (2005).
25.
Id.
26.
Berenson et al., supra note 2, at 973–75; see also ZACK COOPER ET AL.,
THE PRICE AIN’T RIGHT? HOSPITAL PRICES AND HEALTH SPENDING ON THE PRIVATELY
INSURED 27 (2015); Jeffrey Gold et al., Reimbursement for Emergency and Non-Emergency
Services Provided by Out-of-Network Physicians: The Issue of Balance Billing, ABA HEALTH
ESOURCE
(Nov.
2011),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/aba_health_esource_home/aba_
health_law_esource_1111_gold.html.
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Health care,” reported to the Health Care Cost Institute (“HCCI”), Cooper
and colleagues compared private health spending levels among 306 Hospital
Referral Regions.27 They concluded that “health spending on the privately
insured varies by more than a factor of three across the 306 hospital referral
regions (“HRRs”) in the [United States],” and that “hospital transaction
prices play a large role in driving inpatient spending variation across
HRRs.”28
[W]e find that hospitals’ negotiated transaction prices vary
substantially across the nation. For example, looking at the most
homogeneous of the seven procedures that examine, hospitalbased MRIs of lower-limb joints, the most expensive hospital in
the nation has prices twelve times as high as the least expensive
hospital. What is more, this price variation occurs across and
within geographic areas. The most expensive HRR has average
MRI prices for the privately insured that are five times as high as
average prices in the HRR with the lowest average prices.
Likewise, within HRRs, on average, the most expensive hospital
has MRI negotiated transaction prices twice as large as the least
29
expensive hospital.

Cooper and colleagues concluded that even after controlling for such
variables as “for-profit [status], having more medical technologies,” regional
labor costs and patient mix,
[M]onopoly hospitals have 15.3[%] higher prices than
markets with four or more hospitals. Similarly, hospitals in
duopoly markets have prices that are 6.4[%] higher and hospitals
in triopoly markets have prices that are 4.8[%] higher than
hospitals located in markets with four or more hospitals. While we
cannot make strong causal statements, these estimates do suggest
that hospital market structure is strongly related to hospital
30
prices.

In a study tracking hospital prices in California from 2004 to 2013,31
Melnick and Fonkych found that “[h]ospital prices increased substantially
during a period of slow economic growth, and may have been driven in part
27.
COOPER ET AL., supra note 26, at 1–2.
28.
Id. at 2.
29.
Id. at 3.
30.
Id.
31.
Glenn A. Melnick & Katya Fonkych, Hospital Prices Increase in
California, Especially Among Hospitals in the Largest Multi-Hospital Systems, J. HEALTH
CARE ORG., PROVISION, & FINANCING, June 2016, at 1.
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by increased market power by large, multi-hospital systems—and possibly
other smaller systems—practicing all-or-none contracting.”32
They
concluded that:
[T]he market power effects of large hospital systems do not
necessarily require consolidation between local competitors.
Indeed, many of the hospitals in California’s largest systems do
not have substantial overlapping markets with other system
member hospitals. This suggests that hospitals in large hospital
systems, by tying their hospitals together, are able to achieve
market power over prices beyond any local market advantages. 33
[W]ith large size comes the potential to expand and protect market
power.
Large hospital systems that conduct “all-or-none”
contracting have reportedly added other anti-competitive language
to their contracts to protect and expand their market power
including clauses that prohibit health plans or employers from
developing “tiered” benefit packages that would allow them to . . .
develop new products to stimulate competition through differential
cost sharing across member hospitals. Another example is socalled gag-clauses which prohibit health plans from sharing
detailed hospital specific utilization and pricing data with large
employers which might be used to develop benefit packages that
provide incentives for employees to use lower priced—and/or
34
higher quality—hospitals.

Stanford University researcher Laurence C. Baker has assembled a
database of county-level data on competition among physician practices, as
measured by the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (“HHI”), and average prices
for physician services.35 Baker notes that the “trend toward fewer and larger
[physician practice] groups could increase . . . market concentration,
resulting in fewer practices facing less competition and with greater
economic power. This in turn could lead health plans to pay higher prices
for physician services.”36
An analysis by Baker and colleagues of the relationship between
physician competition and prices paid for common office visits found that:
Less competition among physician practices is
statistically significantly associated with substantially higher
32.
Id. at 6.
33.
Id.
34.
Id. at 5–6.
35.
Laurence C. Baker et al., Physician Practice Competition and Prices Paid
by Private Insurers for Office Visits, 312 JAMA 1653, 1654–55 (2014).
36.
Id. at 1654.
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prices paid by private [Preferred Provider Organizations] to
physicians in [ten] large specialties for office visits. . . . [T]he
level of competition observed at the [ninetieth] percentile of the
HHI distribution was associated with a price for an intermediate
office visit with an established patientCPT code
99213between $5.85 and $11.67 higher than at the [tenth]
percentile of the HHI distribution. Across all [ten] types of office
visits, this difference in HHI was associated with mean prices for
37
office visits 8.3% to 16.1% higher.

A subsequent study by Austin and Baker examining prices for fifteen
common high-cost services, such as knee replacements and arthroscopic
surgery, yielded similar findings.38 In that article, Austin and Baker reported
that they “frequently found market concentration levels that appear high,
relative to the commonly encountered view that HHI levels above 2500 are
concerning. HHIs were 2500 or more in more than half of [the] counties
studied among the chosen procedures and specialties.”39 Indeed, both the
mean and median HHI for the many hundreds of counties in “[f]ourteen of
the fifteen procedure-specialty combinations” they studied exceeded the
Federal Trade Commission’s 2500 HHI benchmark for a highly concentrated
market.40 The scale of price differentials was sobering.41 For urology, where
even the tenth percentile of HHI exceeded 2500, the amount paid for a
vasectomy or kidney stone treatment in counties at the ninetieth percentile of
prices, exceeded the amount in counties at the tenth percentile by two and a
half times.42
B.

Excessive Prices for Must-Have Providers

Certain large and prestigious hospitals and physician groups are
recognized as must-have parties to insurers’ provider networks, and demand
and receive prices disproportionate to their clinical outcomes.43 Insurers find
they cannot exclude these providers from their networks, nor place them in
lower tiers, and pass the costs along in the form of higher premiums.44
37.
Id. at 1659.
38.
Daniel R. Austin & Laurence C. Baker, Less Physician Practice
Competition Is Associated with Higher Prices Paid for Common Procedures, 34 HEALTH AFF.
1753, 1753–54 (2015).
39.
Id. at 1759.
40.
Id. at 1756–57.
41.
See id. at 1759.
42.
Austin & Baker, supra note 38, at 1757.
43.
See Berenson et al., supra note 2, at 973.
44.
Id. at 973–74.
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For this reason, Robert Berenson argues that “antitrust policy and
enforcement can only be one—and not the primary—approach to addressing
provider pricing power.”45 He contends “that the source of hospital and
physician pricing power . . . lies . . . in its leverage negotiating contracts with
health insurers,”46 which is not the same as market concentration.47
An essential element of health plan-provider negotiations
over price and other contractual terms and conditions is the
willingness of consumers to accept narrow or tiered network
products that effectively limit their choice of provider to those
willing to accept the health plan’s pricing. Without a credible
threat of either excluding or disadvantaging high-cost providers by
placing them in a higher consumer cost-sharing tier, health plans
lack an important bargaining chip.
....
Another factor is that it has become common health care
parlance to refer to “must-have” providers—especially hospitals—
that must be included in a plan’s provider network to make the
plan marketable to customers. Must-have hospitals, by definition,
have pricing leverage over insurers because the plans cannot
plausibly threaten to exclude or limit their participation in the
48
insurer’s provider networks.

C.

Out-of-Network Hospital-Based Providers and Surprise Billing

Recent years have seen what Berenson calls an “epidemic of
physicians and hospitals in some cases purposefully remaining out of
network to charge either the insurer or the unsuspecting consumer
outrageously high amounts.”49 The movement toward integration and
accountable care has been met with stubborn resistance from hospital-based
physicians at the many community hospitals that outsource their emergency
rooms and other hospital-based specialties to large physician staffing
corporations.50 With their economy of scale, these companies have the
capacity to bill both insurers and patients, and to pursue collection action
against consumers for unpaid bills.51 By setting up shop in hospitals that are

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
Extremely

Berenson, supra note 1, at 714.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 720.
Id.
See Berenson, supra note 1, at 727.
See Joseph Burns, Health Plans Seek Leverage When Physicians Submit
High
Bills,
MANAGED
CARE
(Aug.
2011),
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in-network, they gain access to a captive clientele of consumers who need
care.52 As such, these companies see little advantage to signing network
contracts with insurers that would discount prices.53 Instead, they bill their
charges, obtaining payments for the “usual, customary, and reasonable”
(“UCR”) amounts from insurers and send surprise bills to consumers for the
difference.54
When physicians refuse to contract, the midpoint of the range of
payments used to determine a UCR amount will shift rightward. Ordinarily,
one would expect the distribution to be dominated by Medicare and
Medicaid prices, and network rates discounted for the volume an insurer can
offer, skewing the distribution to the left, with only a few data points at the
right representing self-pay patients paying the full charges.
A distribution of reimbursements for services delivered by nonparticipating providers will be dominated by amounts representing a UCR
payment tendered by an insurer plus any balance between that amount and
the charge that is paid by the consumer. These data points will be higher
dollar amounts, and as they proliferate within a specialty, such as emergency
medicine, the UCR midpoint will ratchet upward. This means higher overall
costs of care, and in making hospital-based specialties more lucrative,
making those careers more attractive to medical graduates. This, in turn,
could increase the supply and utilization of expensive emergency room care,
at the expense of access to primary care.
In addition to the higher costs, there are two other consequences
when hospital-based physicians decline to join insurer networks. For
consumers, one immediate consequence arises from the fact that out-ofnetwork expenditures may not count toward their deductible and out-ofpocket maximum, thereby undermining the Affordable Care Act’s limitations
on medical debt. But the refusal of hospital-based physicians to participate
in networks also has far-reaching implications for the payment and delivery
system reforms that many policymakers and stakeholders hope will improve
quality and efficiency. This is particularly true of emergency medicine
physicians.
Generally speaking, current payment and delivery system reforms
are aimed at giving a group of providers accountability for the total cost of
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2011/8/health-plans-seek-leverage-whenphysicians-submit-extremely-high-bills; Gold et al., supra note 26.
52.
See Burns, supra note 51.
53.
See id.
54.
Gold et al., supra note 26; see also Burns, supra note 51; Deanna
Dewberry, In-Network Emergency Room, Out-of-Network Doctor Could Equal a Big Bill,
NBCDFW (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/In-Network-EmergencyRoom-Out-of-Network-Doctor-Could-Equal-a-Big-Bill-243590331.html.
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care of a population’s health needs or for the cost of an individual’s episode
of care. In such circumstances, providers will be more mindful of
opportunities to avert a potentially avoidable hospitalization and to use
resources efficiently. In global budget models—whether a staff-model
Health Maintenance Organization (“HMO”), an Accountable Care
Organization, or Maryland’s unique Global Budget Revenue program—
providers must deliver care to covered persons within fixed financial
benchmarks.
Providers’ incentives are to manage patients’ chronic
conditions through primary care and care coordination, so they are not
hospitalized and, when patients do appear at a hospital, to avoid unnecessary
resource utilization. Unless a global budget or episode payment system is
imposed by the state—as in Maryland—insurers are the only entity capable
of sponsoring such payment reforms.
The Emergency Department (“ED”) is at the fulcrum of any efforts
to integrate care, so a refusal of emergency medicine physicians to contract
with insurers will undermine reform activities. According to a recent Rand
Corporation study, the ED now accounts for more than one half of hospital
admissions, up from only about one third of admissions in the early 1990s.55
While inpatient admissions overall have declined relative to population
growth in the United States, there has been a 17% increase in admissions
from the ED, offsetting the decrease in admissions from physician offices
and other outpatient settings.56
Meanwhile, a study recently published in the Annals of Internal
Medicine indicates that nearly one in twelve patients who visit an ED return
to an “acute care setting within three days,” with the thirty day re-visit rate
being nearly one in five patients.57
Yet even as there is consensus on the need to reduce avoidable
hospitalizations and ED use, ED physicians increasingly position themselves
outside the insurance system.58 Their only bonds are to the physician
staffing corporations that employ them and the hospital that contracts with

55.
KRISTY GONZALEZ MORGANTI ET AL., RAND CORP.,
OF EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 35, 50 (2013).

THE EVOLVING ROLE

56.
Id. at 24.
57.
Reena Duseja et al., Revisit Rates and Associated Costs After an
Emergency Department Encounter: A Multistate Analysis, 162 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 750,
754 (2015).
58.
See GONZALEZ MORGANTI ET AL., supra note 55, at 3; Elisabeth Rosenthal,
Costs Can Go Up Fast When E.R. Is in Network but the Doctors Are Not, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
28,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/29/us/costs-can-go-up-fast-when-er-is-innetwork-but-the-doctors-are-not.html?_r=0.
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them—two entities that generally have financial incentives to increase
admissions and increase emergency room traffic.59
IV.
A.

POLICY OPTIONS TO ADDRESS PROVIDER PRICING PROBLEMS
All-Payer Rate Setting for Providers as a Policy Option

A key distinction between America’s pluralistic system of multiple
payers and those of peer nations, according to Anderson and colleagues, is
that “the government-controlled health systems of Canada, Europe, and
Japan allocate considerably more market power to the buy side.”60 In
essence, the health insurance plans overseas are more monopsonistic.61
Anderson argues that while a monopsonistic purchaser
is ultimately constrained by market forces on the supply side—that
is, by the reservation—minimally acceptable—prices of the
providers of health care below which they will not supply their
goods or services. . . . [W]ithin that limit, monopsonistic buyers
enjoy enough market clout to drive down the prices paid for health
care, and health care inputs fairly close to those reservation
62
prices.

For this reason, a number of prominent United States health-policy
thought leaders endorse some type of all-payer rate setting regime.63 In
2012, a who’s who of center/left health policy experts called for:
[A] model of self-regulation, [under which] public and private
payers would negotiate payment rates with providers, and these
rates would be binding on all payers and providers in a state.
Providers could still offer rates below the negotiated rates. The
privately negotiated rates would have to adhere to a global
spending target for both public and private payers in the state.
After a transition, this target should limit growth in health
spending per capita to the average growth in wages, which would
combat wage stagnation and resonate with the public. We
recommend that an independent council composed of providers,

59.
See GONZALEZ MORGANTI ET AL., supra note 55, at 27, 38, 55; Rosenthal,
supra note 74.
60.
Anderson et al., supra note 20, at 102.
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
See id.; Ezekiel Emanuel et al., A Systemic Approach to Containing
Health Care Spending, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 949, 950 (2012).
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payers, businesses, consumers, and economists set and enforce the
64
spending target.

Robert Berenson endorses a regulatory approach that would place
price ceilings on negotiated rates that come out of insurer-provider
negotiations and upper limits on billing to consumers, beyond the
negotiated rates insurers agree to pay, set as a percentage above
the Medicare yardstick. Setting upper limits would bound the
prices, while permitting market negotiations to focus on selected
networks with discounting and with new payment models—market
approaches that can be difficult to preserve in a full-fledged all65
payer rate-setting environment.

While many health policy analysts would like to see all-payer rate
setting for providers, there are two major political barriers to this option.66
First, it is contrary to the American preference for a light regulatory touch. 67
As seen in the continuing battles over state certificate-of-need laws,
conservatives remain unconvinced that “health care is different” and merits
restrictions on prices or supply that remain unthinkable in other areas of the
economy.68
Second, providers are vehemently opposed to restrictions on the
prices they can charge, as seen in the opposition to the Massachusetts
proposal for a luxury tax on expensive hospitals,69 and to the proposed
mergers of four large insurers announced in 2015.70

at 975.
at 975.

64.
65.
66.
67.

Emanuel et al., supra note 63, at 950.
Berenson, supra note 1, at 738.
See id. at 725–26, 738; Berenson et al., supra note 2, at 979.
See Berenson, supra note 1, at 712, 729–30; Berenson et al., supra note 2,

68.

See Berenson, supra note 1, at 726–27, 733; Berenson et al., supra note 2,

69.
See H.R. 4070, 187th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2012); Chris Camire,
Reps
Eye
‘Luxury
Tax’
on
Massachusetts
Hospitals,
LOWELL
SUN,
http://www.lowellsun.com/news/ci_20618865/reps-eye-luxury-tax-massachusetts-hospitals
(last updated May 14, 2012, 6:35 AM). The hospital luxury tax proposal was a provision of a
Massachusetts House bill that would have imposed a 10% tax on hospitals charging more than
20% above the state median price for a specific service if they could not “prove they offer[ed]
higher-quality service than [other] facilities.” H.R. 4070; Camire, supra. The funds were to
have been redistributed to hospitals serving poor communities. Camire, supra; see also H.R.
4070. The provision was stripped from the final version of the legislation, but a variation on
the concept has been revived for a current ballot initiative in Massachusetts. S.B. 2260, 187th
Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2012); Camire, supra.
70.
Hancock, supra note 14.
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But while health care provider rates are regulated in only one state,
Maryland, there is a long-standing tradition of regulating insurer rates.71
This Article will argue in the next section that this regulatory structure can be
marshaled to put downward pressure on provider prices.72
B.

Insurance Regulation as an Alternative to Rate-Setting for Providers

Robert Berenson notes that, to date, “the market response to the
increase in prices resulting from growing provider leverage in rate
negotiations has been limited and largely ineffective.”73 McKinsey Global
Institute argues that this is because of a health care supply chain in which
“stakeholders are either unwilling or unable to resist cost increases that are
passed along to them.”74 In its view, cost increases from physicians and
hospitals are “pass[ed] on . . . to the next player in the chain. . . . Unless the
[United States] health system addresses this dynamic, medical inflation
cannot help but continue.”75
The consensus of a 2004 panel discussion on the health care industry
was that employers are “missing in action” on health care prices:
[M]ost employers have not pushed back at providers and insurers
to lower cost and premium trends, relying instead on shifting costs
to workers through higher patient cost sharing—higher deductibles
and co-insurance, for example. The panelists agreed that in the
near term employers will continue to shift costs to workers but that
cost sharing as a long-term cost-containment strategy [will not]
76
work.

“We [have not] seen the employers kick in because their first line of
defense has been cost shifting, which has been an effective strategy in the
short run, but you can only raise the deductible to $1000 one time. So, [there
is] a cliff here that [we are] coming to,”77 said Robert Laszewski, President
of Health Policy and Strategy Associates.78
[The] exception to the lack of purchaser pushback against higher
cost and premium trends is the California Public Employees
Retirement System, or (“CalPERS”), analysts agreed, but they
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
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were skeptical that CalPERS’ decision to exclude several dozen
hospitals from its health maintenance organization—HMO—
79
networks would prompt other purchasers to take a harder line.

One of CalPERS’ strategies is described infra.80 Employers and
insurers could have good reason to be reluctant to apply pressure to
providers.81 Purchasers must maintain a good working relationship with the
doctors and hospitals to which they entrust enrollees’ care.82 Further, the
only recourse if a provider’s price is too high is to walk away from
negotiations and accept a narrower network that may be less attractive to
employees and consumers.83
The thesis of this Article is that purchasers might be emboldened if
they are backed up by an insurance regulator who is leading and facilitating a
coordinated pushback campaign. In the Author’s view, many commissioners
have two major legal tools available for deployment, but much of their role
would be hortatory as public figures having a central role in the health care
system oversight.
Insurance laws in at least three states already direct commissioners
to inquire into underlying health care costs, specifically calling attention to
provider prices.84
79.
Id.
80.
See Ann Boynton & James C. Robinson, Appropriate Use of Reference
Pricing
Can
Increase
Value,
HEALTH
AFF.:
BLOG
(July
7,
2015),
http://www.healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/07/07/appropriate-use-of-reference-pricing-canincrease-value/; infra Section IV.B.2.
81.
See CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, supra note 2, at 2–3.
82.
Burns, supra note 51.
83.
See CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, supra note 2, at 2;
Berenson et al., supra note 2, at 974–75.
84.
See e.g., 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-14.5-2. With respect to health insurance
as defined in Title 42, Section 14.5-2 of the Rhode Island Health Care Reform Act, “the health
insurance commissioner shall discharge the powers and duties of office to:”
(1) [g]uard the solvency of health insurers; (2) [p]rotect the interests of consumers;
(3) [e]ncourage fair treatment of health care providers; (4) [e]ncourage policies and
developments that improve the quality and efficiency of health care service delivery
and outcomes; and (5) [v]iew the health care system as a comprehensive entity and
encourage and direct insurers towards policies that advance the welfare of the
public through overall efficiency, improved health care quality, and appropriate
access.

42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-14.5-2. “Changes in the insurer’s health care cost containment and
quality improvement efforts included, as an appendix to the filing and labeled, ‘Appendix II:
Cost Containment and Quality Improvement Efforts.’” OR. ADMIN. R. 836-053-0473 (2016).
The cost containment and quality improvement efforts must:
(A) [e]xplain any changes the insurer has made in its health care cost containment
efforts and quality improvement efforts since the insurer’s last rate filing for the
same category of health benefit plan; (B) [d]escribe significant new health care cost
containment initiatives and quality improvement efforts; (C) [i]nclude an estimate
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To be sure, a commissioner cannot succeed in this project without
the support of the payer community, including the insurers themselves.
Insurers would have to embrace the role of price-cutter, even though, as
explained infra, their financial incentive to do so can be ambiguous. One
assumption is that industry rhetoric-deploring high prices is sincere and the
regulatory path would be welcomed. Another assumption is that norms
promulgated in the state-regulated insurance sphere would spill over into the
larger employer-sponsored insurance sphere.
This effort would therefore also require the support of self-insured
employers that retain insurance companies on an administrative services only
basis. Employers have perhaps the greatest financial interest in obtaining
lower prices from insurers, although the insurance commissioner’s authority
is at low ebb—if not absent altogether—when an insurer acts solely as a third
party administrator.
Thus, to a great extent, the regime envisioned is one in which the
commissioner is acting as much as a convener and coordinator as he is a
regulator.
An advisory committee of purchaser representatives and
consumer advocates would give the project added heft. A commissioner
who is a gubernatorial appointee—and most are—would also need the
political support of a governor who believes its state is competitively
disadvantaged by high health care costs. Success would also be greatly aided
by the cooperation of the state’s Attorney General. Attorneys General have
traditionally wielded some oversight of health care as enforcers of antitrust
law and as interpreters of laws governing non-profit corporations such as
Blue plans and hospitals.
1.

Use of Rate-Setting Authority to Require Pushback on Prices

According to a Kaiser Family Foundation analysis of state statutory
authority to review health insurance rates, “[thirty-five jurisdictions]
including the District of Columbia—ha[ve] prior approval authority over . . .
[premiums in] some portion of the individual and small group market,” with
“[twenty-two] ha[ving] prior approval authority over all major medical
of the potential savings from the initiatives and efforts described in subsection
(2)(g)(B) of this section together with an estimate of the cost or savings for the
projection period; and (D) [i]nclude information about whether the cost
containment initiatives reduce costs by eliminating waste, improving efficiency, by
improving health outcomes through incentives, by elimination or reduction of
covered services or reduction in the fees paid to providers for services.

Id. Section 1385.03(c)(3) of the California Health and Safety Code requires plans to detail
“significant new health care cost containment and quality improvement efforts and provide an
estimate of potential savings together with an estimated cost or savings for the projection
period.” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1385.03(c)(3) (West 2015).
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health insurance products in both the individual and small group markets;”
and in the remaining “states, prior approval authority [is] limited” to
subgroups of products.85 Additionally, the analysis noted “some states with
little to no authority to regulate rates,” including some file and use states,
have negotiated rate reductions.86 The typical statutory grant of regulatory
authority over premiums provides that “[r]ates shall not be excessive,
inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.”87
Insurance regulators could withhold permission to increase
premiums that reflect provider market power due to inappropriate
consolidation and order insurers to pursue antitrust litigation when prices and
HHI exceed a certain threshold. Rates could be set so that an insurer’s
profits are reduced in proportion to excessive prices that are deemed to be
within the insurer’s power to reduce. In other words, the regulator would
prescribe upper limits on medical expenditures representing quantity times a
target price in line with national averages. The target price could be lowered
in increments annually to give time for insurers to act.
In this scenario, the commissioner would put insurers on notice that
they need to push back on prices and levy a tentative, but avoidable, fine
payable in the event that they do not act. This fine is meant to be borne
collectively, not individually, to reflect provider market power only, and not
any differential market power of insurers of varying size. The fine should be
set to promote cooperation among insurers in preparing antitrust litigation
and to have an in terrorem effect on providers that softens their negotiating
stance. The commissioner, as a state actor with antitrust immunity, could
lawfully coordinate insurers’ actions toward target price levels.
Suppose insurers file rates that assume a medical cost trend of 5%,
based upon current provider prices, and a 3.5% profit margin. The
commissioner could decree a lower cost trend based upon a target price and
set rates so that if the target were not met, the insurer profit margin would be
one or two percentage points lower.
It is worth noting that federal law mandating a minimum medical
loss ratio using a percentage of gross revenues88 may have a perverse effect
making insurers less likely to push back on prices. For instance, a health
plan with 10,000 enrollees, which has annual medical reimbursements at the
United States per-enrollee average in 2009, would spend $33,140,000,
85.
SABRINA CORLETTE & JANET LUNDY, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., RATE REVIEW: SPOTLIGHT ON STATE EFFORTS TO MAKE HEALTH INSURANCE MORE
AFFORDABLE 9 (2010).
86.
Id. at 10.
87.
D.C. CODE § 31-3508(e)(2) (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.2403(1)(d)
(2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.018(4)(b) (2015).
88.
42 U.S.C. § 2718 (2015).
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permitting it to keep $5,000,000 for administrative costs and profits.
Meanwhile a plan with 10,000 enrollees in Rochester, New Yorkwhere
prices and utilization are relatively lowwould expect just $23,190,000 in
medical reimbursements, and would be allowed to keep only $3,500,000 for
administrative costs and profits. Presumably, insurance executives prefer
operating in markets where higher provider prices give insurers additional
cushions for administrative costs and profits.
The concept envisioned here is intended to be deployed in regions
where costs are excessive and those costs are attributable to high prices. A
commissioner can look to benchmarks to make a determination as to whether
prices are excessive. National data is available from various sources, which
can be used to compare a region’s prices for hospitals and physicians.
Prices beyond a certain threshold could be the triggering mechanism
for the pushback process. For example, the HCCI has promulgated a set of
economic metrics they have dubbed the Healthy Marketplace Index
(“HMI”), “intended to provide baseline measurements of health care market
performance related price, productivity, and competition.”89
An HMI measures a “basket of health care services allowing for
consistent comparisons” across regions at the Core-Based Statistical Area
(“CBSA”) level, permitting “differences between markets [to] be attributed
to prices rather than the types or amounts of services used.”90 An “index
value of 1.00 indicates that, on average for a basket of services, the prices in
the CBSA were equal to those of the total population.”91 A CBSA with an
index value of 1.05 would have prices 5% higher.92
Suffice it to say, there is no obvious threshold for a price index
trigger. The Dayton, Ohio inpatient price index of 1.18 would seem to
qualify as a true outlier, but the Milwaukee level of 1.09 would also justify
taking action if it is causing insurance premiums to be unaffordable for
consumers or businesses.
The triggering mechanism could have multiple parts. An HHI
measurement exceeding 2500, or an even higher threshold, would verify that
market concentration is the principal culprit in high prices. A third triggering
benchmark could look to hospital financial indicators. High levels of
hospital reserves, profit margins, or executive compensation could be viewed
as markers of excessive prices.

89.
See ERIC BARRETTE, HEALTH CARE COST INST., INC. TAKING THE PULSE OF
HEALTH
CARE
MARKETS
1
(2015),
http://www.healthcostinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/Data-Brief-2-September-2015-HMI.pdf.
90.
Id. at 2.
91.
Id.
92.
Id. at 3.
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While the substance of antitrust law relating to health care providers
is beyond the scope of this Article, one can point to a template for private
antitrust enforcement by an insurer against a provider: Litigation mounted in
the 1990s by Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wisconsin v. Marshfield
Clinic.93 The case was hardly straightforward in either its atypical fact
pattern—the insurer eventually prevailed because it proved the defendant had
divided territories with a potential competitor but no damages were awarded;
and judgment on a monopolization charge under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act was reversed—or in its procedural journey—two trials and two trips to
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.94 Rather, it illustrates the ideal
envisioned: An insurer serving a high-cost region taking on a large health
system that had stifled competition, bearing great expense to painstakingly
assemble a complex case and pursue it aggressively.95 Warren Greenberg,
who served as an expert witness for the plaintiff, noted that this expense was
borne entirely by one insurer, even though a successful outcome would have
benefited competing insurers, consumers, and employers who did not
contribute.96 A multi-payer mandate from a commissioner to pursue such
litigation would more fairly apportion costs.
To be sure, a rate ruling that effectively orders insurers to file
antitrust litigation would represent a heavy lift.97 First, there are legal
hurdles.98 As Robert Berenson wrote, “[t]he [h]orse [h]as [a]lready [l]eft the
[b]arn”99 in the sense that “monopolies lawfully acquired or, in the case of
consummated mergers, fully entwined entities . . . are impractical to
successfully unwind.”100
In such instances, plaintiffs could request conduct remedies that
would “regulate the conduct of the monopolist, for example, by providing for
binding arbitration to resolve payer-provider price disputes or requiring
maintenance of open medical staffs.”101
Second, litigation would be expensive. It would be helpful if one of
the many philanthropies dedicated to health care policy could fund a forensic
resource center to marshal legal and economic thinking relevant to modern

1995).

93.

152 F.3d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 1998); see also 65 F.3d 1406, 1408 (7th Cir.

94.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 152 F.3d at 588, 590–96; Blue
Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 65 F.3d at 1416–17.
95.
See Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 152 F.3d at 590–91.
96.
Greenberg, supra note 6, at 118 n.1, 122, 123; see also Blue Cross & Blue
Shield United of Wis., 152 F.3d at 590–91.
97.
See Berenson, supra note 1, at 713–14.
98.
See id. at 725–26.
99.
Id. at 725.
100.
Id. at 726 (citation omitted).
101.
Id. (citation omitted).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol41/iss3/3

18

Williams: The Persistence Of Opportunistic Business Models In Health Care A

2017]

BUSINESS MODELS IN HEALTH CARE

331

understanding of health care organizations, formulate principles and
guidelines for applying antitrust and non-profit law, and collect evidence for
and testify in adversarial proceedings.
2.

Commissioners’ Catchall Authority to Declare Insurance Acts and
Practices Unfair

A commissioner’s plenary authority to prohibit unfair practices
could be used to prohibit insurers from capitulating to contracting terms that
reflect inappropriate provider market leverage, particularly in the sphere of
the must-have provider. Many states’ insurance codes include a grant of
authority similar to this:
If the [c]ommissioner believes that any person engaged in
the insurance business is in the conduct of such business engaging
in this state in any method of competition or in any act or practice
not defined in NRS 686A.010 to 686A.310, inclusive, which is
unfair or deceptive and that a proceeding by the Commissioner in
respect thereto would be in the public interest, the Commissioner
shall, after a hearing of which notice and of the charges against
such person are given to the person, make a written report of the
findings of fact relative to such charges and serve a copy thereof
102
upon such person and any intervener at the hearing.

Melnick and Fonkych urge policymakers to limit:
“all-or-none” contracting by multi-hospital systems and
prohibiting other anti-competitive contract language that flows
from market power achieved by large multi-hospital systems.
Such pro-competitive regulation would allow for hospital systems
to integrate to improve efficiencies without the deleterious side
effects of increased market power which can result in reduced
103
price competition and higher costs to consumers.

A commissioner’s catchall authority might be invoked to accomplish
this.104 Rhode Island’s Health Insurance Commissioner has promulgated
“Hospital Contracting Conditions, [and] [t]hese conditions support
102.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 686A.170(1) (2016); see also CAL. INS. CODE §
790.06(a) (West 2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-130(1) (West 2016); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 33-18-1003(1) (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-63-40(a) (2016).
103.
Melnick & Fonkych, supra note 31, at 6 (footnote omitted).
104.
See STATE OF R.I. & PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS OFFICE OF THE HEALTH
INS. COMM’R, CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE PRINCIPAL REASONS FOR AND AGAINST THE
ADOPTION OF THE AMENDMENTS TO OHIC REGULATION 2, POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE
OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE COMMISSIONER 7–8 (2015).
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affordable health insurance by making the approval of insurer rate filings
contingent on the [h]ealth [i]nsurer’s agreement to abide by contracting
standards with hospitals that limit service price inflation, improve the quality
of care, and work towards increased administrative efficiencies.”105
The Hospital Contracting Conditions have two main provisions.106
One limits annual rates of price increases for inpatient and outpatient
services to increases in the CMS Hospital Input Price Index plus 1% for each
year covered by the contract.107 The second “require[s] that insurer contracts
with hospitals include a quality incentive program, [in which] at least 50% of
the annual price increase for hospitals must be” tied to performance on
quality measures.108
According to Christopher F. Koller, the former Rhode Island Health
Insurance Commissioner, legal authority for promulgating the conditions was
implied by the combination of the statutory mandate to improve health care
quality and efficiency and the power to approve rates.109 The fact that no
explicit oversight of hospital rates was granted to the Commissioner suggests
that regulators in other states could also take an expansive view of catchall
authorities to pursue this option.110
Tools used by government agencies as active purchasers are not
closely analogous to those available to the insurance regulator, but could
conceivably be adapted.111 Covered California, the insurance exchange
established in that state to implement the Affordable Care Act, has
conditioned participation in its marketplace on an insurer’s efforts to obtain
low prices from providers.112 Beginning in 2018, an insurer that wants to sell
in the California exchange must “report on its strategy to assure that
contracted providers are not charging unduly high prices, which may include
but are not limited to: Telemedicine [and] [u]se of Centers of Excellence.”113
While the intent is not explicitly stated, the mention of telemedicine
and Centers of Excellence suggests that the state might encourage insurers to
substitute providers who are outside the region for overpriced providers
105.
Id. at 12.
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
108.
Id. at 12–13.
109.
See 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-14.5-2(4) (2016).
110.
See id.; STATE OF R.I. & PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS OFFICE OF THE HEALTH
INS. COMM’R, supra note 104, at 7–8.
111.
See 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-14.5-2(4); PLAN MGMT. ADVISORY GRP.,
COVERED CAL.: PLAN MANAGEMENT AND DELIVERY SYSTEM REFORM ADVISORY GROUP
MEETING
AND
WEBINAR
18
(2016),
hbex.coveredca.com/stakeholders/planmanagement/PDFs/Plan-Management-Advsiory-Group-FINAL-slides-2016-2-11.pdf.
112.
PLAN MGMT. ADVISORY GRP., supra note 111, at 18.
113.
Id.
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within its service area.114 An insurer might be able to find academic medical
centers outside its geographic market that have prestige equal to local musthave providers but are willing to treat patients at a lower cost.115 Covered
California has also indicated that by 2019, insurers “will be expected to
exclude hospitals and other facilities that demonstrate outlier high cost.”116
It is surely easier to tell insurers that they must exclude overpriced
outliers from their networks in the exchange market than in the small group
market because: (1) insurer participation in the exchanges is voluntary, and
it is now presumed that it will constitute less than 100% of companies and
(2) employer-sponsored insurance is a fringe benefit used to attract
employees, so there is greater pressure to have a robust network.117 It might
be easier to facilitate or mandate reference pricing, which preserves access to
the high priced provider, than to ban the high-priced provider altogether.118
With reference pricing, a payer includes expensive, must-have
providers in its network but requires the patient to pay the difference
between what a lower-cost provider charges and the higher price.119
The payment limit typically is the median or some other mid-point
in the distribution of prices in the local market. Consumers who
select a provider that charges less than the purchaser’s limit
receive standard coverage, with minimal cost sharing. Consumers
who select a provider charging above the contribution limit must
120
pay the entire difference.

The technique was pioneered by CalPERS, and it is unclear whether
it has migrated from self-insured plans to fully-insured plans. Insurance
regulators cannot set administered prices like Medicare or Maryland’s allpayer rate setting board; however, they could create safe harbors for
reference prices by approving, in advance, acceptable price levels for a given
procedure in a market. This could pressure high-cost providers to lower their
prices. A commissioner might go a step further by declaring payments
beyond a set luxury level to constitute an unfair insurance practice, having
the effect of imposing a reference price requirement.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
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Convening Insurers to Fight Balance Billing

Under the quantum meruit doctrine, which governs medical billing
in the absence of agreed-to price terms, out-of-network physicians are
entitled only to UCR-based reimbursement.121 As such, an insurer’s payment
of the UCR amount should suffice to make the physician whole—at least two
courts have held that balance billing is restricted under such
circumstances.122 But, because most consumers do not have the savvy or
resources to fight these bills, which may have an adverse effect on credit
scores, this plainly illegal business model has succeeded.123 Insurance
regulators could spur insurers to pledge to defend collection lawsuits, which
would likely bring an end to the out-of-network business model and bring
these physicians into networks at lower prices.124
Under common law principles, when a consumer obtains a service
without an express agreement as to price, the legal doctrine of quantum
meruit applies.125 The classic example of this, as explained by Judge Richard
Posner in Confold Pacific, Inc. v. Polaris Industries, Inc.,126 is the patient
who comes to the emergency room with no ability to inquire into or negotiate
over prices.127 In such circumstances,
the plaintiff [doctor] is entitled to the market value of his services
rather than to the benefit that he conferred on the defendant, which
might be much greater—for example, if the plaintiff physician had
saved the defendant’s life. The court tries to simulate a
competitive market; and in such a market, price is based on the
cost to the seller rather than on the subjective value to the buyer,
which often is much greater.128

The Pennsylvania Superior Court applied this doctrine in its decision
in Temple University Hospital, Inc. v. Healthcare Management Alternatives,
Inc.129 That case involved the amount the hospital was owed by a health
insurer for services rendered after the network contract between the parties

121.
See Gianetti v. Riether, No. CV020398555S, 2011 WL 4347211, at *4–5
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2011).
122.
Id.; Dennis v. PHC-Martinsville, Inc., No. CL 14-483, 2016 WL 4717657,
at *7 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 31, 2016).
123.
See Dennis, 2016 WL 4717657, at *7.
124.
See 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-14.5-2(5).
125.
Confold Pac., Inc. v. Polaris Indus., 433 F.3d 952, 958 (7th Cir. 2006).
126.
433 F.3d 952 (7th Cir. 2006).
127.
Id. at 958.
128.
Id.
129.
832 A.2d 501 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
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expired.130 The hospital insisted that the insurer was liable for billed charges
at its published rates, or chargemaster.131 But, evidence at trial established
“that the [h]ospital . . . [received 80%] or more of its full published charges
only [6%] of the time.”132 Further, data indicated “that the [h]ospital was
paid its full published charges only [1] to [3%] of the time” and that its “full
published [rates] represented 300% of the [h]ospital’s [actual input] costs.”133
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania explained that in the absence of
agreement on price terms, Pennsylvania “law implies a quasi-contract, which
requires the defendant to pay to plaintiff the value of the benefit
conferred,”134 or “a reasonable fee for a health provider’s services.”135
“Thus, in a situation such as this, the defendant should pay for what the
services are ordinarily worth in the community.”136 “Services are worth what
people ordinarily pay for them.”137
Since the relevant question is “what health care providers actually
receive for those services,”138 if a provider rarely recovers its billed charges,
those charges “cannot be considered the value of the benefit conferred
because that is not what people in the community ordinarily pay for medical
services.”139 The purpose of quantum meruit is to place the provider in the
position he would have been in had services been delivered in the ordinary
course of business, not in a “better position than [he] would have been had
the services been performed for the majority of [his] other patients.”140
Therefore, in instances where the insurer has tendered a UCR
amount, the doctor has been compensated in full.141 As such, there ordinarily
130.
Id. at 505.
131.
Id.
132.
Id. at 506.
133.
Id.
134.
Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc., 832 A.2d at 507 (quoting AmeriPro Search, Inc.
v. Fleming Steel, Co., 787 A.2d 988, 991 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001)).
135.
Id. at 508 (citing Eagle v. Snyder, 604 A.2d 253, 254 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992)).
136.
Id. (citing Eagle, 604 A.2d at 254).
137.
Id. (citing Eagle, 604 A.2d at 254, 256).
138.
Id.
139.
Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc., 832 A.2d at 500.
140.
Id. at 509; see also Hailey v. Medcorp., Inc., No. L-05-1238, 2006 WL
2640238, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2006) (vendor can collect only “the reasonable value
of the material and services that accrued to the actual benefit of the other party . . . .”); Doe v.
HCA Health Servs. of Tenn., Inc., 46 S.W.3d 191, 197–98 (Tenn. 2001); River Park Hosp.,
Inc. v. Bluecross Blueshield of Tenn., Inc., 173 S.W.3d 43, 57–58 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). In
Illinois, providers can collect charges if they are equivalent to UCR. See Victory Mem’l
Hosp. v. Rice, 493 N.E.2d 117, 11920 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
141.
See Gianetti v. Riether, No. CV020398555S, 2011 WL 4347211, at *5
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2011).
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should remain no lawful balance to collect from the patient.142 A
Connecticut case, Gianetti v. Riether,143 has so held.144
Gianetti was a plastic surgeon on call in an emergency room. 145 He
treated the defendant and was reimbursed $349.54, on an out-of-network
basis, by the defendant’s insurance company; he then billed the patient for
the balance of his $425 charge, $75.46.146
The court held that the doctor did not meet his burden of proving
“that $425 was the reasonable value of such service.”147 “The plaintiff
provided no evidence as to what similar doctors or physicians charge for
similar work.”148 “The plaintiff provided no evidence concerning his usual
and customary charges for similar work.”149 But the court went on:
Additionally, there is evidence from which the court can
and does find that the reasonable value of the first item was only
$349.54. The court takes judicial notice that health insurance
companies typically reimburse physicians for the usual and
customary charges for similar medical services by area physicians.
The amount reimbursed is prima facie evidence of the
reasonableness of such charges. The plaintiff has failed to rebut
such evidence. Consequently, the court finds that the plaintiff was
fully compensated therefor.150

Similarly, the court in Dennis v. PHC-Martinsville, Inc.,151 rejected a
hospital’s billed charges of $111,115.37 and looked to “the reasonable value
of . . . services rendered to” the patient.152 The court determined that it
would be “the amount the hospital would have received had Dennis pre-paid
his bill as an uninsured patient.”153 The hospital’s policy was to grant a 75%
discount from its chargemaster amount in such circumstances.154 This
amount was $27,778.84, which was $523.89 more than Dennis’s insurer had

2011).

142.
143.

See id.
No. CV020398555S, 2011 WL 4347211 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 42,

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151
152.
153.
154.

See id. at *5.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Gianetti, 2011 WL 4347211, at *5,
Id.
Id.
No. CL14-483, 2016 WL 4717657 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 31, 2016).
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol41/iss3/3

24

Williams: The Persistence Of Opportunistic Business Models In Health Care A

2017]

BUSINESS MODELS IN HEALTH CARE

337

paid.155 As such, unlike Gianetti’s patient, Dennis was ordered to pay a
relatively small balance.156
The hospital has appealed the ruling to the Virginia Supreme
157
Court.
Three Virginia health care lawyers commented that “the Dennis
decision is a shot across the bow for all hospitals” and “may have significant
implications for the current rate-setting and debt collection process for
hospitals.”158
A third decision is worth mentioning here, although it does not
involve interpretation of the common law.159 Texas’ workers compensation
statute sets forth several criteria for fixing the compensation of out-ofnetwork providers, one of which is a fair and reasonable amount, which
appears to be congruent with the standard for quantum meruit awards.160
Reimbursement of Air Ambulance Services Provided by PHI Air
Medical161 presented the question of whether an air ambulance service could
collect its full billed charges that were “typically at least two to three times
the Medicare rate” when 72% of the provider’s patients received 125% of the
Medicare rate or less.162 The insurance carriers involved had tendered
reimbursement at 125% of Medicare.163 An Administrative Law Judge,
analyzing the facts under the fair and reasonable criterion, found that the
billed charges did not meet the standard because “patients should not be
required to pay two or three times the rates paid by 72% of PHI’s
patients.”164
In determining the appropriate reimbursement amount, the
Administrative Law Judge looked to the provider’s operating costs.165 The
judge settled upon 149% of Medicare as fair and reasonable because it

155.
Id.
156.
Compare Gianetti v. Riether, No. CV020398555S, 2011 WL 4347211, at
*5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2011), with Dennis, 2016 WL 4717657, at *7.
157.
Jeremy Ball et al., The Dennis Decision: A Shot Across the Bow for
Hospitals, JDSUPRA (Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-dennis-decisiona-shot-across-the-20038/.
158.
Id.
159.
See Decision and Order, In re Reimbursement of Air Ambulance Servs.
Provided by Phi Air Med., Docket No. 454-15-0681.M4 (Tex. Dep’t of Ins. Sept. 8, 2015).
160.
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 413.011(d) (West 2015); Jackson Williams,
Policy Dir., Dialysis Patient Citizens & NAIC Funded Consumer Rep., Public Hearing on
Surprise Balance Billing of Health Insurance Consumers (Oct. 1, 2015).
161.
Decision and Order, supra note 217.
162.
Id.
163.
Id.
164.
Id.
165.
Id.
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reflects PHI’s average cost to provide service to each patient and
to attain the profit it has earned the past few years. . . . [T]his is the
amount that, if paid by every PHI patient, would allow PHI to
operate exactly as it did during the time period at issue, making a
profit that Carriers’ expert conceded is adequate. 166

When state common “law caps out-of-network physician fees at the
market price, . . . legislation is not necessary to prohibit balance billing.”167
The cases cited here indicate that balance billing is essentially a bluff that is
not being called due to a collective action problem.168 What is needed is a
coordinated effort to enforce current law.
While [a]
[c]ommissioner may not have jurisdiction over providers, she does
have jurisdiction over insurers, and can therefore convene insurers
and consumer advocates to act cooperatively. Patients pay balance
bills because: (1) they [do not] know their rights; (2) they are
afraid of unpaid bills affecting their credit scores; and (3) they
would be unable to defend a collection lawsuit if the physician
staffing company filed one. All three of these barriers can be
overcome through sub-regulatory action by [a] [c]ommissioner and
cooperation by insurers. This has been done before.
....
. . . [I]n the 1990s, no-fault auto insurers in Michigan
were involved in a similar dispute with providers over the legality
of balance billing. The insurers banded together, and with the
approval of the insurance commissioner, did the following: (1)
advised their insureds [not] to pay the balance bill; (2) told the
insureds that if they were sued by the provider, the insurer would
defend them and indemnify them if they lost the suit; (3) warned
the credit reporting agencies [not] to report the balance on the
consumer’s credit report. The providers did not file collection
suits but instead filed two class action lawsuits—one in state court,
one in federal—seeking a declaratory judgment of their right to
collect balances. Both suits were quickly dismissed, and the
problem was resolved.
....
. . . [T]he favorable case law can be leveraged to protect .
. . consumers . . . who are balance-billed [through] a collaboration
in which stakeholders undertake the following activities: . . .
Insurance Commissioner: respond to consumer complaints about
balance billing by telling consumers they are free to disregard bills
166.
Decision and Order, supra note 217 (footnote omitted).
167.
Williams, supra note 160; see also Confold Pac., Inc. v. Polaris Indus.,
433 F.3d 952, 958 (7th Cir. 2006).
168.
See Confold Pac., Inc., 433 F.3d at 958; Williams, supra note 160.
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if the insurer has paid the UCR amount—the commissioner may
have to verify that insurers are using a legitimate method of
determining UCR; confirm that the Temple [rationale] applies to
all hospital-based out-of-network providers; admonish credit
reporting agencies that they must not report balance-bill debts
furnished by these providers because they are inaccurate;
promulgate an official [Explanation of Benefits notification
(“EOB”)]; . . . Insurers: commit to defending and indemnifying
their insureds in the unlikely event of a physician’s collection
lawsuit; notify consumers of their rights on EOB forms; . . .
Consumer Advocates: coordinate activities; publicize the project;
disseminate the project to other states; find consumer attorneys
willing to sue under the Fair Credit Reporting Act if credit
reporting agencies do not cooperate.
I would not anticipate a need for insurers to actually
defend individual lawsuits. The staffing companies would need to
pull physicians away from their hospital shifts to testify in court if
collection cases were defended. [F]urther, these companies
operate across states and could not afford the risk of making bad
law—generating a direct unfavorable legal precedent—that could
immediately force changes to their business model in other states.
....
. . . [One suspects] that the simple fact of a joint
announcement by [a] [c]ommissioner and insurers to pursue the
Michigan option, communicated to consumers on the EOB, would
169
suffice to end balance billing in [a state where it is a problem].

If not, however, the [c]ommissioner could help facilitate bellwether
trials.170 In the context of federal multi-district litigation, bellwether trials
are arranged for cases deemed typical of the multiple claims consolidated
before the multi-district litigation court.171 The outcomes of such trials give
litigants a sense of the settlement value of claims, expediting compromise of
all the litigation.172 In the context of out-of-network providers, bellwether
trials could fix the quantum meruit value of services, ideally as a percentage

169.
Williams, supra note 160; see also Advocacy Org. for Patients &
Providers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 176 F.3d 315, 326–27 (6th Cir. 1999); Temple Univ.
Hosp., Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Alts., Inc., 832 A.2d 501, 510 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
170.
See Advocacy Org. for Patients & Providers, 176 F.3d at 328; McGill v.
Auto. Ass’n of Mich., 526 N.W.2d 12, 14 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Williams, supra note 160.
171.
Advocacy Org. for Patients & Providers, 176 F.3d at 318, 328.
172.
See id. at 318; Burns, supra note 51.
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of Medicare rates.173 The [c]ommissioner could play a coordinating role in
getting payers to share the costs of such trials.174
V.

CONCLUSION

The problem of excessive provider prices is well understood, well
documented, and one for which several existing legal and practical remedies
are available. In the Author’s view, the principal hurdle to alleviating the
problem is one of will. The same multiplicity of purchasers that causes them
disadvantage relative to providers in negotiating prices also deters individual
purchasers from taking action upon which other purchasers could free-ride.
If lower health care prices are truly a public good, the solution is for
government to marshal cooperative efforts among purchasers. The Insurance
Commissioner’s authority and stature as a representative of consumer
interests make that office a natural locus for coordination.

26.

173.

See Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc., 832 A.2d at 507–09; Gold et al., supra note

174.
See Advocacy Org. for Patients & Providers, 176 F.3d at 328 n.9.
Commissioners may also have a regulatory option: Mandating, as part of their enforcement of
network adequacy regulations, that an insurer have at least one fully participating hospital in
their network. See HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN NETWORK ACCESS AND ADEQUACY MODEL ACT § 5
(Nat’l Ass’n Ins. Comm’rs 2015). A fully participating hospital would be one that guarantees
either that its hospital-based physicians will be in that insurer’s network, or that the hospital
will hold patients harmless for any balance billing. See Burns, supra note 51; Gold et al.,
supra note 26. This concept, first suggested by a regulator participating in a National
Association of Insurance Commissioners workgroup, draws inspiration from the Blue Cross
Blue Shield Association’s Blue Distinction program. See Blue Distinction Centers of
Excellence,
EXCELLUS
BLUECROSS
BLUESHIELD,
http://www.excellusbcbs.com/wps/portal/xl/prv/pc/coe (last visited May 8, 2017); Gold et al.,
supra note 26. That program lists Centers of Excellence for various procedures that have been
vetted by BCBSA. See Blue Distinction Centers of Excellence, supra; Gold et al., supra note
26. The hospitals have the option of certifying that any hospital-based physicians delivering
ancillary care during or in consequence of the procedure are also in-network, and presumably
these hospitals will be more attractive to consumers worried about surprise bills. See Gold et
al., supra note 26. The fully participating hospital proposal assumes two premises: First, that
consumers would prefer such a hospital, even for emergency care, and consult their insurer’s
provider directory—or heed a fully-participating hospital’s advertising—to learn which
nearby hospital has that status; second, that hospitals would perceive a competitive advantage
from the status and that one or more would require that the staffing agency granted the
physician franchise in their facility agree to terms with insurers or submit their rates to binding
arbitration. See id. To date, hospitals have been unwilling to impose such a requirement. Id.
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